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RISK-UTILITY BALANCING IN
DESIGN DEFECT CASES
David G. Owen*
Design defectiveness is generally defined in terms of a risk-utility
balance, the form of liability test adopted by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability. However, confusion abounds in
how courts formulate such balancing tests. A national survey of
recent appellate court decisions reveals that courts generally define
the balance in terms of the product's risks and utility, a formulation
which appearsto call for weighing the product'sglobal costs against
the product's global benefits. So defined, the design defect test is
incorrect. What appellate courts mean for juries to decide, and what
juries ordinarilydo in fact decide, is the much more narrow 'microbalance" of the costs and benefits of the particulardesign feature
that the plaintiffclaims the manufacturerought to have adopted. If
courts reformulate the test of design defectiveness in this more
precise and focused manner, design defect litigation should be
improved.

INTRODUCTION

Deep within the interior of design defect jurisprudence,
balancing bedlam prevails. Courts and commentators increasingly comprehend that ascertaining design defectiveness in
products liability cases requires some kind of "risk-utility"
balancing,' but neither courts nor commentators seem to
understand just what that balance should entail. In case after
case, courts uphold verdicts rooted in risk-utility proof and
argument--on the balance of costs and benefits of improving
the safety of a product's design-without inquiring closely into

*
Byrnes Scholar and Professor of Tort Law, University of South Carolina School
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1.
See, e.g., Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 255 (Miss. 1993)
(stating that risk-utility has become the "trend in most federal and state jurisdictions"
and adopting the risk-utility standard for design defect cases).
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how to formulate the balance properly. And when most courts
and commentators do attempt to define the balance, to state
with some precision just what should be balanced against what,
they quickly lose themselves, conceptually and linguistically, in
a tangled thicket of "risks" and "benefits" and "costs" and
"utility."
Just what should be balanced against what in design defect
cases? Should all the risks of the manufacturer's chosen product
design, viewed in the aggregate, be balanced against all of that
same design's aggregate utility? Or is the proper balance
between the aggregate risks and utility of the alternatively
designed product that the plaintiff claims ought to have been
adopted? Does the true balance require a comparison of the
risks and utility of the chosen design, on the one side, against
the risks and benefits of the proposed alternative design, on the
other? Or should courts more narrowly balance the incremental
risks (or costs) and utility (or benefits) resulting solely from
altering the design in the particular manner proposed by
plaintiff? Balancing questions like these penetrate to the very
heart of design defectiveness decisions, but few courts or
commentators have attempted to unravel the mysteries that lie
within the various formulations of the balancing equation.2
The new Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability

acknowledges the central role of the risk-utility balancing
enterprise in determining whether a particular design is
defective,3 and it structures the black letter definition of design
defectiveness around whether, on balance, some safer alternative design was better than the manufacturer's chosen design.4
2.
W Kip Viscusi is a notable exception. See W KiP VIscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS
LLBILrrY 62-86 (1991) (critically examining design defectiveness formulations); W. Kip
Viscusi, Wading Through the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 573,
574 (1990) (same).
For an elaboration of many points in this Article, see David G. Owen, Toward a
ProperTest for Design Defectiveness: "Micro-Balancing"Costs and Benefits, 75 TEx. L.
REV. (forthcoming May 1997).
3.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY § 2 cmts. a, b, c, d, e, &

f (Proposed Final Draft, 1997) [hereinafter Proposed Final Drafti (explaining the
liability rule to be a risk-utility balancing test).
4.
See id. § 2(b) ("A product... is defective in design when the foreseeable risks
of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design.., and the omission of the alternative design renders the
product not reasonably safe."). For a suggestion that this standard supports an inquiry
into whether the plaintiffs proposed design was on balance better than the defendant's
chosen design, see id. § 2 cmt. f. Even if the proposed design is on balance better than
the chosen design, however, the chosen design is not thereby automatically rendered
defective, for "a number of variations in the design of a given product may meet the test
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*Yet the new Restatement waffles, like most courts and commentators, on precisely how a proper balancing test for design
defect cases should be formulated. The Restatement states
broadly that the risks and benefits of the chosen and alternative designs should somehow be compared,' but it adopts the
popular "grab-bag" approach, throwing into the balance nearly
everything in sight.6
This Article argues that design defectiveness is properly
ascertained by a narrow balance of the costs of changing the
chosen design, as plaintiff claims was necessary, against the
resulting safety benefits of so changing the design. A liability
standard may be formulated in such terms in a manner
consistent both with the new Restatement's definition of design
defectiveness and with how such cases actually are adjudicated.
The Article first explores the definitional bedlam in risk-utility
formulations revealed by a survey of recent cases. It then turns
to balancing theory to uncover the basic principles from which
a proper risk-utility balance may be constructed, and then
fashions two versions of a risk-utility balancing test from such
principles. The Article concludes that proper risk-utility
balancing in design defect cases requires courts to "microbalance" the costs and benefits of altering the chosen design in
the manner proposed by the plaintiff. An Appendix compiles

* in Subsection b." Id. It is possible, in other words, for there to be multiple reasonably
safe products. See generally David G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the
"Strict"ProductsLiability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 770-72.
5. Among a "broad range" of possibly pertinent factors, the Reporters include the
"relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as designed and as it alternatively could have been designed." Proposed Final Draft, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. f.
6.
The Restatement (Third) section 2 comment f provides in part:
A broad range of factors may be considered in determining whether an alternative
design is reasonable and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably
safe. The factors include, among others, the magnitude and the probability of the
foreseeable risks of harm, the instructions and warnings accompanying the
product, and the nature and strength of consumer expectations regarding the
product. The relative advantages and disadvantages of the product as designed
and as it alternatively could have been designed may also be considered. Thus, the
likely effects of the alternative design on production costs; the effects of the
alternative design on product longevity, maintenance, repair, and esthetics; and
the range of consumer choice among products are factors that may be taken into
account. Plaintiff is not necessarily required to introduce proof on all of these
factors; their relevance, and the relevance of other factors, will vary from case to
case.
Id. § 2 cmt. f.
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recent examples of risk-utility balancing formulations from
states which use this form of definition for design defectiveness.

I. BALANCING FORMULATIONS IN THE COURTS

Confusion about what properly should be balanced against
what abounds in the judicial opinions. Courts variously describe
the balance, sometimes one way, sometimes another.' In an
effort to determine if there is a clearly accepted definition of the
risk-utility test, some standard manner in which the balancing
test is formulated in the case law, I conducted a national survey
of design defect balancing tests defined in judicial decisions
over the last several years. 8
The survey revealed several important insights into how the
courts are defining the risk-utility balance. First, there is no
single clearly accepted view as to how the design defect balancing test should be described or formulated. A related finding is
that there is considerable variation in how the balancing test is
formulated among the states, among decisions within the same
state, and often even within the same judicial opinion.' Another
finding is that courts today quite typically cobble together a
variety of separate and often conflicting formulations of balancing tests borrowed, without analysis, from earlier opinions.1"
Further, many courts acknowledge that a variety of factors
should be balanced but neither discriminate between the various factors nor explain how they should be balanced or otherwise interrelate. 1 Finally, and most importantly, a disturbing

7.
Among many examples, consider Nichols v. Union UnderwearCo., 602 S.W.2d
429 (Ky. 1980). In his concurring opinion, Justice Lukowsky defined the "social utility
standard-risk versus benefit" in four separate formulations, which may be summarized
as follows: (1) a balance of the chosen design's utility to the public ("benefits") against
the chosen design's risks to the public, (2) a balance of the chosen design's risk to the
public against the alternative design's cost plus any diminished utility to the public, (3)
a balance of the chosen design's risks to the plaintiff against the chosen design's utility
to the public, and (4) a balance of the chosen design's risk to the public against the
chosen design's utility to the public. See id. at 434 (Lukowsky, J., concurring).
8.
For the survey results, see infra app.
9.
See infra app.; supra note 7 and accompanying text.
10.
See, e.g., Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (N.Y. 1995) (finding
support for New York's risk-balancing test in numerous cases and commentaries).
11.
This manner of addressing the factors might be called the "grab-bag" approach.
Cf supra note 6 and accompanying text. For perhaps the classic example of this
approach, see Banks v. ICIAmericas,Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 & n.6 (Ga. 1994), which
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trend toward a global form of risk-utility evaluation of a product's overall balance of advantages and risk is discernable in
judicial opinions. Each of these findings reflects fundamental
confusion as to the precise nature and components of a proper
cost-benefit analysis for use in design defect cases.
Appellate courts increasingly appear to be adopting a global
form of risk-utility evaluation of design defectiveness, a test
which might be described as requiring "macro-balancing."
Under this approach, the defect question is framed in terms of
a comparison between a product's entire bundle of risks and the
product's entire bundle of utility. That is, the balance of good
and bad in a product is examined in the aggregate. If the
product's aggregate risk exceeds its aggregate social utility, it
is defective; if its aggregate utility exceeds its aggregate risk,
the product is nondefective. 2 Although courts rarely endorse
this form of global balancing explicitly, 3 the manner in which
provides a "non-exhaustive" list of more than 30 factors---"no finite set of factors can be
considered comprehensive or applicable under every factual circumstance, since such
matters must necessarily vary according to the unique facts of each case." Id.; see also
Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 184 (Colo. 1992) (listing Dean Wade's famous
seven factors adopted in Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410 (Colo.
1986), and noting that the list is "not exclusive, but merely illustrative of factors which
may assist in determining whether or not a design is unreasonably dangerous.
Depending on the circumstances of each case, flexibility is necessary to decide which
factors are to be applied, and the list of [Wade factors] may be expanded or contracted
as needed"); see infra app. at n.34 and accompanying text (quoting the Wade factors).
12.
The widespread notion that a product's aggregate social utility and aggregate
risk may have some relevance to design defectiveness may find its roots in two of Dean
Wade's famous seven factors: "(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole"; and "(2) The safety aspects of the
product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the
injury." John W. Wade, On the Nature ofStrict Tort Liability for Products, 44 MIss. L.J.
825, 837 (1973). The Wade factors have become embedded in the design defect jurisprudence of many states, although courts generally do not use the factors as a formal
liability standard. See, e.g., Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 184 (listing but not applying
summary of Wade factors as reformulated in an earlier case); Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 735
(same). See generally Viscusi, supranote 2, at 574 (examining the difficulty of applying
the Wade factors to design defect risk-utility decisionmaking).
13.
For one court's explicit endorsement of such a global risk-utility approach, and
its explanation of how it differs from the more narrow micro-balance approach, see
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982). The court reasoned
that
we can distinguish two tests for determining whether a product is safe: (1) does
its utility outweigh its risk? and (2) if so, has that risk been reduced to the
greatest extent possible consistent with the product's utility? The first question
looks to the product as it was in fact marketed. If that product caused more harm
than good, it was not reasonably fit for its intended purposes. We can therefore
impose strict liability for the injuries it caused without having to determine
whether it could have been rendered safer. The second aspect of strict liability,
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they generally describe the risk-utility test strongly suggests

this interpretation. Thus, a global balance appears explicitly
denoted when a court refers to "balancing the overall risk and
utility of a product," 14 and a global balance appears implicitly

contemplated when a court states that design defect determinations require "balancing the utility of the product against the
risks involved in its use." 5 It is this latter type of macrobalance formulation that courts 6 increasingly have adopted as
a definitional standard of defectiveness in design defect cases. 7
Defining design defectiveness in macro-balance terms poses
a variety of problems," foremost of which is that this form of
definition fails to state the issue as it is ordinarily litigated in
courtrooms across the nation. This situation presents a fundamental jurisprudential problem because the liability standard
announced by the appellate courts contravenes the law as it
actually is applied. The issue generally litigated is not whether
an accident-producing product was globally good or bad for
society. 1' Instead, the question typically at issue is whether the
manufacturer might have avoided the accident (and possibly
however, requires that the risk from the product be reduced to the greatest extent
possible without hindering its utility. Whether or not the product passes the
initial risk-utility test, it is not reasonably safe if the same product could have
been made or marketed more safely.
Id. at 545 (citation omitted).
14.
Penick v. Christensen, 912 S.W.2d 276, 283 (Tex. App. 1995) (emphasis added);
see also Denny, 662 N.E.2d at 736 (ascertaining defectiveness "requires a weighing of
the product's dangers against its over-all advantages").
15.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383-84 (Tex. 1995).
16.
Commentators have not been immune from this disease, also sometimes
speaking loosely in macro-balance terms. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 99, at 699 (5th ed. 1984) ("Under [the 'danger-utility test
approach, a product is defective as designed if, but only if, the magnitude of the danger
outweighs the utility of the product.").
17.
See Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994) (finding that an
"exhaustive review of foreign jurisdictions and learned treatises" reveals "a general
consensus regarding the utilization in design defect cases of a balancing test whereby
the risks inherent in a product design are weighed against the utility or benefit derived
from the product").
For examples of courts that have adopted this test, see infra app.
18.
These problems are examined in Owen, supra note 2.
19.
Whether courts should abstain altogether from attempting to adjudicate most
products liability cases on this kind of global basis involves the thorny and nascent
issue of category liability for generic product risks, a topic that commentators are only
beginning to explore. See, e.g., DAvID G. OWEN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY-CAsES AND MATERIALS 440-71 (3d ed. 1996) (addressing product category and generic
risk liability); Symposium, Generic ProductsLiability, 72 CH.-KENT L. REV. (forthcoming
1997); see also infra note 30. Although theoretically intriguing, cases raising this issue
are rarely litigated and can easily be addressed on an ad hoc basis.
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others) by changing the product's design in some manner that
was relatively inexpensive, that did not unduly diminish the
product's usefulness, and that did not introduce excessive new
dangers which the chosen design did not possess.20 These
litigated issues also involve a balance, of course, but one much
narrower than that contemplated by the macro-balance
formulations often articulated by appellate courts in their
design defect risk-utility definitions.
To distinguish the narrow courtroom balance from its mischievous big sister macro-balance, one might label the former
a "micro-balance." The micro-balance scales care not about the
overall risk, utility, or quality of a product but seek only to
evaluate the costs and benefits of adopting the particular
alternative design feature proposed by plaintiff to determine
whether its omission may be viewed as having made the product
defective. 2 Thus, micro-balancing-not macro-balancing-is
revealed to be the form of risk-utility balancing properly used
by lawyers and trial judges in the litigation of design defect
22
cases.

II. BALANCING THEORY: CONSTRUCTING A PROPER BALANCE
FOR DESIGN DEFECT CASES

In addition to its empirical validation in trial courtrooms, the
micro-balance approach to design defectiveness is also firmly
grounded in tort law theory. Tips on balancing from Learned
Hand, Richard Posner, Mark Grady, and Stephen Gilles all
point the way to this type of narrow formulation of the balancing enterprise. One may begin by examining Judge Learned
Hand's celebrated negligence formula in United States v.
Carroll Towing Co. ,23 by which negligence (N) is suggested if

20.
See RICHARD J. HEAFEY & DON MX KENNEDY, PRODUCT LIABILITY: WINNING STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES §§ 4.04,4.05 (1994) (describingplaintiffstrategies in design defect

cases); Paul Rheingold, The Risk/Utility Test in Product Cases, TRIAL LAW. Q.,
Summer/Fall 1987, at 49-51 (same).

21.
In the terms of the products liability Restatement, the test is whether the
omission of"a reasonable alternative design... renders the product not reasonably safe."
Proposed Final Draft, supra note 3, § 2(b).
22.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Weslo, Inc., 906 P.2d 336, 339-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(discussing whether trampolines could be redesigned but not whether trampolines are
valuable).
23.
159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
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the defendant's burden of precaution (B) was less on balance
than the magnitude and likelihood of harm (the probability, P,
of an accident occurring times the likely magnitude of the loss,
L); thus, B < P x L -4 N. The importance of the Hand formulation to negligence theory generally, and to products liability law
more specifically, is widely accepted.2 4
The Hand formula does not base liability on the global
desirability of the activity. Instead, it focuses narrowly upon the
advisability of taking hypothetical precautions (B) that the
defendant did not take. As Richard Posner explained some time
ago, the Hand formula quite simply balances the cost ("burden")
of accident avoidance against the expected cost of accidents that
could be so avoided (measured by their probability or frequency
25
and magnitude).
The balancing focus, therefore, is not on the activity or
product as a whole; instead the inquiry should be limited to an
evaluation of the costs and benefits of the "untaken precaution,"
to use Mark Grady's helpful term. 26 Thus, the proper risk-utility
inquiry involves balancing the various costs of a particular
accident prevention measure against the particular resulting
safety benefits, as Stephen Gilles has well explained in a recent
analysis of the Hand approach. 27 One should conclude, therefore, that sound risk-utility balancing involves a micro-balance
of the costs and benefits of the untaken precaution that plaintiff
claims was warranted in the circumstances.28
Now that the general enterprise of risk-utility balancing is
understood to be properly based on micro-balance principles,
the question becomes how to formulate a liability standard that
reflects such principles for use in design defect cases. It is
helpful here to restate the particular issue as it actually is
litigated in such cases: whether the manufacturer might have
avoided the accident by adopting a relatively inexpensive design
alteration which would not have unduly reduced the product's

24.
See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REv. 1015,
1025 (1994); Owen, supra note 4, at 753-61.
25.
See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-34
(1972).
26.
Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1989).
27.
See generally Gilles, supra note 24.
28.
This suggests that "cost-benefit," rather than "risk-utility, is a better label for
a liability standard based on such a balance. See generally Owen, supra note 2
(explaining this labeling preference).
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usefulness or safety in the process. Although there are a variety
of ways in which these ideas may be combined in a liability
standard, one way to formulate such a test is as follows:
A product is defective in design if the safety benefits from
altering the design as proposed by plaintiff were foreseeably
greater than the resulting costs, including any diminished
usefulness or diminished safety.
This formulation of the risk-utility standard includes each of
the key factors that generally are relevant in design defect
cases:
(1) the safety benefits that would result from the plaintiffs proposed design alteration-generally the centerpiece
of plaintiffs proof and argument in such cases;
(2) foreseeability-an important limiting factor even in
the "strict" liability context; 29 and
(3) the expected costs of the proposed design alteration-usually increased production costs, but sometimes
also the "costs" of diminished usefulness and injuries to
other persons from risks newly introduced by the design
alteration.
Embracing each of the major factors generally relevant to the
design defect issue, the liability standard as formulated above
should work well as a general liability test in most such cases.
No doubt, however, certain types of cases will present certain
special problems that may be captured only awkwardly by a
test that is formulated so explicitly in cost-benefit terms.
Additional factors might be added explicitly to the standard, but
this would push the test down the slippery slope of factor
expansion until it landed with a splat in a multifarious "grabbag" pile of particularized balancing factors that would serve
more to confound than to clarify the central balancing issue.
Better than heaping sundry particularized factors into the
general risk-utility test, courts instead should apply the
conventional common law case-by-case evolutionary approach
to new situations and simply broaden or create exceptions to

29.

See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 3, § 2(b) & cmts. a, d, f, & m.
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the standard for special situations, as fairness and circumstances in particular cases may warrant. It is possible, however,
to broaden the test explicitly in a manner that would allow
virtually any case to fit the preexisting standard, an approach
which some courts may prefer. Such a broadened micro-balance
risk-utility test might be phrased as follows:
A product is defective in design if it was not designed with
reasonable safety, such that the safety benefits from
altering the design as proposed by plaintiff were foreseeably
greater than the resulting costs, including any diminished
usefulness or diminished safety.
Including a "reasonable safety" provision in the liability
standard both strengthens and weakens the test. Its strength
lies in the inclusion of a general and vague "reasonable safety"
catchall provision, a safe harbor which explicitly may embrace
almost any situation. Such a "reasonable safety" provision
would allow judges and jurors to circumvent the specific and
more rigid cost-benefit factors in cases where fairness and
justice so require. 0 Yet the very generality of this catchall
provision also constituLes its weakness: the vagueness that
would permit its enlightened use in some cases by conscientious
judges and jurors would also permit its abuse in other cases by
judges and juries able to hide perverse results in the mists of
the standard's vagueness and generality.
Regardless of the form of the standard, whether it be drawn
specifically or with a general safe harbor, defining liability in
micro-balance terms should be a vast improvement over the
macro-balance formulations that presently contaminate the
design defect jurisprudence of so many states. Indeed, the
precise formulation of such a liability test is less important
than is the adoption of some form of micro-balance standard as
the basis for defining design defectiveness.3 1 Once courts and

30.
Thus, the "reasonable safety" formulation would provide an explicit basis for
allowing recovery for generic product defects in certain narrow cases where a very
dangerous product with very low social utility would plainly flunk a risk-utility macro-

balance test. The new classic example of such a product is a novelty exploding cigar
which can cause serious injuries. See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 3, § 2 cmt. e &
illus. 5. But a court adopting the narrower formulation of the standard as a general test
for design defectiveness could simply carve an exception for this type of case. This is the
approach taken by the new Restatement. See id. § 2 cmts. d & e.

31.

In his article in this Symposium, Judge Keeton proposes jury instructions that

nicely capture the essence of the micro-balance concept. See Robert E. Keeton, Warning
Defect: Origins, Policies, and Directions, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367 (1997).
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commentators discern the importance of defining the risk-utility
balancing test in proper micro-balance terms, one may fairly
expect to observe improvements in how design defect cases are
processed and resolved.

CONCLUSION

Bedlam has prevailed too long in the definitions of risk-utility
balancing found in design defect cases, as a survey of recent
appellate opinions across the nation reveals. By posing the
liability issue in global terms of whether the product's aggregate risks exceed the product's aggregate utility, many courts
have linguistically lost their way in a frightful jungle of macrobalancing terminology that seriously misstates the issues
actually and properly litigated in such cases. The true issues in
design defect cases surround the costs and benefits of altering
the design in a manner that the plaintiff claims would have
prevented the harm. A focused micro-balance of these more
narrow issues forms the basis for a risk-utility liability standard that should help to clarify the adjudication and review of
design defectiveness determinations.
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APPENDIX
DESIGN DEFECT BALANCING TESTS BY STATE
The following is a sample of design defect balancing tests
from states which use such tests (whether the underlying
liability theory be negligence, implied warranty, or strict
liability in tort). The results derive from a series of computer
searches conducted in 1996 of the products liability case law of
every state and the District of Columbia. 32 The search focused

on recent opinions in which the court explicitly indicated what
should be balanced against what in ascertaining design
defectiveness. Thus, the survey was not designed to examine
exhaustively the law of every state33 nor to reveal the current
or "true" definition of design defectiveness in each such state.
Many of the opinions surveyed contain protracted discussions
of design defectiveness, so the excerpts here are necessarily
selective and incomplete. The objective of this compilation is to
provide a portrait of the types of design defect balancing
definitions currently used in the nation's appellate courts.
In defining the risk-utility balance, many of the opinions
surveyed referenced in some manner the following widely cited
list of seven liability factors formulated by Dean Wade when
strict products liability in tort was in its infancy:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its
utility to the user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it
will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would
meet the same need and not be as unsafe.

32. The searches sought cases decided in recent years which used some combination of the terms "design," "defect!," "risk(s)," "utility," "cost(s)," and "benefit(s)" in close
proximity. Below is a sampling of cases that provided explicit balancing formulations
as a means of defining design defectiveness, whether called "risk-utility," "risk-benefit,"
"cost-benefit," or labeled some other way or not at all.
33.
For such a study, see John F. Vargo, The Emperor'sNew Clothes:The American
Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth" for Section 402A Products Liability Design
Defects-A Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 493
(1996). A number of products liability reform statutes define design defectiveness in
balancing terms, and the Vargo study canvassed such legislation. By contrast, our
computer study picked up such statutory provisions only indirectly by finding judicial
opinions which interpreted such legislation.
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(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe
character of the product without impairing its usefulness or
making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care
in the use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability, because of general
public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or
of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of
spreading the loss by setting the price of the product or
carrying liability insurance.3 4

I. GENERAL PRODUCT CASES

California-Aproduct is not defective in design if the design
benefits "'outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design,'
[a] determination involvling] technical issues of feasibility, cost,
practicality, risk, and benefit which are 'impossible' to avoid. In
such cases, the jury must consider the manufacturer's evidence
of competing design considerations . . . ." Soule v. General
Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994) (citations omitted)
(quoting Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal.
1978)).
Colorado"A product is unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in
its design if it creates a risk of harm to persons which is not
outweighed by the benefits to be achieved from such design"
.... In order to determine whether the risks outweigh the
benefits of the product design, the jury must consider
different interests, represented by certain factors such as
the Wade factors.
Armentrout v. FMC Corp., 842 P.2d 175, 182, 183-84 (Colo.
1992) (quoting with approval the standard jury instructions
used in the lower court's proceedings).

34.

Wade, supra note 12, at 837-38.
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District of Columbia-To establish that a design is defective,
"the plaintiff must 'show the risks, costs and benefits of the
product in question and alternative designs,' and 'that the
magnitude of the danger from the product outweighed the costs
of avoiding the danger.'" Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v.
Boston, 654 A.2d 1272, 1276 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Hull v. Easton
Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Georgia-The Supreme Court recently found upon
an exhaustive review of foreign jurisdictions and learned
treatises ... a general consensus regarding the utilization
in design defect cases of a balancing test whereby the risks
inherent in a product design are weighed against the utility
or benefit derived from the product. This risk-utility
analysis incorporates the concept of "reasonableness" ...
given the probability and seriousness of the risk posed by
the design, the usefulness of the product in that condition,
and the burden on the manufacturer to take the necessary
steps to eliminate the risk.
Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673, 675 (Ga. 1994)
(citations omitted).
Hawaii-A negligent design claim requires proof "that the
manufacturer was negligent in not taking reasonable measures
in designing its product to protect against a foreseeable risk of
injury" considering such factors as
(1) balancing the likelihood and gravity of the potential
harm against the burden of precautions which would
effectively avoid the harm; (2) the style, type, and particular
purpose of the product; (3) the cost of an alternative design,
since the product's marketability may be adversely affected
by a cost factor that greatly outweighs the added safety of
the product; and (4) the price of the product itself.
Wagatsuma v. Patch, 879 P.2d 572, 583-84 (Haw. Ct. App.
1994).
A strict liability design claim may be established either by
the consumer expectations or risk-utility test. The risk-utility
test requires determining whether "the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such
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design" considering the balance of the Wade factors. Id. (citing
Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp. Inc., 659 P.2d 734, 739-40
(Haw. 1983)).
KansasGenerally, evidence of a safer alternative design seems to
lend itself to a risk-benefit analysis. The risk-benefit
analysis looks in part to whether there is a safer feasible
alternative, whether such an alternative is cost effective,
and whether there are risks associated with the alternative
design.... While evidence of a safer alternative design is
not required in all cases, there must be a specific claim
concerning what aspect of the design was defective for a
plaintiff to prevail on a strict liability design defect claim.
Jenkins v. Amchen Prods., 886 P.2d 869, 890 (Kan. 1994) (citing
Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 360 (Kan. 1982)), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 80 (1995).
Kentucky-A product is defective if its risk is such "that an
ordinarily prudent company engaged [in the business], being
fully aware of the risk, would not have put it on the market
... ." Nichols v. Union Underwear Co., 602 S.W.2d 429, 433
(Ky. 1980).
Compare Justice Lukowsky's concurring opinion in which he
variously defines the "social utility standard-risk versus
benefit" in formulations which may be summarized as follows:
(1) a balance of the chosen design's utility (benefits) to the
public against the chosen design's risks to the public; (2) a
balance of the chosen design's risk to the public against the
alternative design's cost plus any diminished utility to the
public; (3) a balance of the chosen design's risks to the plaintiff
against the chosen design's utility to the public; and (4) a
balance of the chosen design's risk to the public against the
chosen design's utility to the public. See id. at 434 (Lukowsky,
J., concurring).
Maine--"To determine whether a product is defectively dangerous, we balance the danger presented by the product against its
utility." Guiggey v. Bombardier, 615 A.2d 1169, 1172 (Me.
1992).
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Maryland-Determining design defectiveness "involves
balancing 'the utility of the design and ... [the Wade] factors
against the magnitude of that risk.' "Klein v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 608 A.2d 1276, 1280 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (quoting
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 961 (Md. 1976)).
MassachusettsIn evaluating the adequacy of a product's design, the jury
should consider, among other factors, the gravity of the
danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that
such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a
safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to
the consumer that would result from an alternative design.
Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 970 (Mass. 1978), quoted
in Caron v. General Motors Corp., 643 N.E.2d 471, 476 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994)).
MichiganIn determining whether a defect exists, the trier of fact
must balance the risk of harm occasioned by the design
against the design's utility. A plaintiff has the burden of
producing evidence of the magnitude of the risk posed by
the design, alternatives to the design, or other factors
concerning the unreasonableness of a design's risk.
Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 380 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (citations omitted).
Minnesota-A manufacturer is required to use reasonable care
in design, determined by "'a balancing of the likelihood of
harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the burden
of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm.'"
Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d 352, 356
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d
616, 621 (Minn. 1984)).
Mississippi-A design is defective by "risk-utility analysis" if
"the utility of the product is outweighed by the danger that the
product creates .... In balancing a product's utility against the
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risk of injury it creates, a trial court may find it helpful to refer
to the seven [Wade factors]." Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage,
617 So. 2d 248, 254, 256 n.3 (Miss. 1993).
Montana-In a design defect alternative design claim, a "jury
should be instructed to weigh various factors," including, as
relevant, the reasonable probability of harm from the chosen
and alternative designs, the feasibility of the alternative design,
the relative costs of the two designs, and the time required to
implement the alternative design. Rix v. General Motors Corp.,
723 P.2d 195, 201-02 (Mont. 1986) (following the UNIF. PROD.
LIAB. ACT (1979)).
New Hampshire-Inascertaining design defectiveness,
courts should consider factors such as social utility and
desirability. The utility of the product must be evaluated
from the point of view of the public as a whole ....
In
weighing utility and desirability against danger, courts
should also consider whether the risk of danger could have
been reduced without significant impact on product effectiveness and manufacturing cost.
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 846 (N.H.
1978) (citations omitted).
New Jersey-A product contained a design defect "if its risk
outweighed its utility." Roberts v. Rich Foods, Inc., 654 A.2d
1365, 1371 (N.J. 1995).
New Mexico-In determining design defectiveness, the jury is
instructed to consider "'the ability to eliminate the risk without
seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it
unduly expensive."' A product is defective "if a reasonable
person would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically
perceived danger as it is proved to be at the time of the trial
outweighed the benefit of the way the product was so designed
and marketed." Brooks v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 902 P.2d 54,
61-62 (N.M. 1995) (quoting uniform jury instruction and Page
Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defects, 5 ST.
MARY's L.J. 30, 37-38 (1973)).
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New York-The risk-utility standard applicable to design
defect cases "demands an inquiry into such factors as" the Wade
factors. "[A] weighing of the product's benefits against its risks
is an appropriate and necessary component of the liability
assessment." At the same time, the "strict products concept of
a product that is 'not reasonably safe' requires a weighing of the
product's dangers against its over-all advantages." Denny v.
Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E.2d 730, 735-36 (N.Y. 1995) (citing
Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983)).
Ohio-Under the Ohio products liability reform statute, a
product is defective in design if" 'the foreseeable risks associated with its design ... exceeded the benefits associated with
that design. . . ' "The factors pertinent to the foreseeable risks
include:
(1) the nature and magnitude of the risks of harm; (2) the
likely awareness of product users of those risks of harms;
(3) the likelihood of harm in light of intended and reasonably foreseeable uses; and (4) the extent to which the design
or formulation conformed to standards that were in effect
when the product left the manufacturer. The factors to be
considered when determining the benefits include: (1) the
utility of the product; (2) the feasibility of using an alternative design or formulation; and (3) the nature and magnitude of foreseeable risks associated with an alternative
design or formulation.
Carrel v. Allied Prods. Corp., No. 9-94-24, 1995 WL 423388, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 11, 1995) (quoting OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.75(B), (C) (Anderson 1995), Ohio's products liability
reform statute).
Oregon-Determining whether a product is defectively
designed requires "balancing the product's utility against the
magnitude of risk associated with its use. Where the utility of
the product is great and any change of design necessary to
alleviate the risk would adversely effect its utility, such a
product is not defectively designed .

. . ."

Hoyt v. Viteck, Inc.,

894 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Roach v.
Kononen/Ford Motor Co., 525 P.2d 125 (Or. 1974); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974)).
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Pennsylvania--"[A] court must possess the qualities of both a
social philosopher and a risk-utility economic analyst." The
court in such cases "must balance 'the utility of the product
against the seriousness and likelihood of the injury and the
availability of precautions that ... might prevent the injury."'
Fitzpatrickv. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322,324 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(quoting Burch v. Sears,Roebuck & Co., 467 A.2d 615, 618 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1983)).
South Carolina-A product is defective "if the danger associated with the use of the product outweighs the utility of the
product"-a balancing act determination which requires a
consideration of numerous factors "'including the usefulness
and desirability of the product, the cost involved for added
safety, the likelihood and potential seriousness of injury, and
the obviousness of the danger.' " Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, 462
S.E.2d 321, 328 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Claytor v. General
Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982)).
Tennessee--"The determination of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous turns on whether, balancing all the relevant
factors, a prudent manufacturer would market the product
despite its dangerous condition ... consider[ing] usefulness,
costs, seriousness and likelihood of potential harm, and the
myriad of other factors" often collectively labeled a risk-utility
test. Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tenn. 1996) (citing
Banks v. ICIAms., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (Ga. 1994)).
Texas--"Determining if a design is unreasonably dangerous
requires balancing the utility of the product against the risks
involved in its use." Caterpillar,Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379,
383-84 (Tex. 1995) (citing Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584
S.W.2d 844, 847 & n.1 (Tex. 1979)).
Washington-A product does not have a reasonably safe
design if
the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's
harm or similar harms, and seriousness of those harms,
outweighed the burden on the manufacturer to design a
product that would have prevented those harms and the
adverse effect that an alternative design.., would have on
the usefulness of the product ....
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Anderson v. Weslo, Inc., 906 P.2d 336, 340 (Wash. Ct. App.

1995) (summarizing and applying product liability reform
statute design defect provision, WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.030(1)

(a) (1988)).
II. PRESCRIPTION DRUG CASES

Following are the design defect balancing tests set forth in
recent prescription drug cases revealed by the computer survey.
Courts in such cases generally rely heavily upon comment k to
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled "Unavoidably unsafe products."35 This comment states that manu-

facturers of properly labeled prescription drugs should not be
held strictly liable for side effects merely for providing the
public with "an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk."36
Whether manufacturers of prescription drugs should be subject
to liability for design dangers is a difficult question that raises
peculiar problems that may be inadequately addressed through
the normal form ofjudicial cost-benefit analysis used for testing
the design adequacy of other types of products.37
Arkansas-For comment k "to protect the designer of the
product, the benefit of the product must outweigh the risk."
West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark. 1991).

Florida-"Any weighing of a product's risk against its benefit
should consider the value of the benefit, the seriousness of the
risk, and the likelihood of both. For comment k to apply, the
product's benefits must outweigh its known risks as of the date
the product is distributed." Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576

So. 2d 728, 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
Idaho-Comment k "contemplates a weighing of the benefit of
the product against its risk. Obviously, for comment k to apply,
35.
36.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
Id.

See Proposed Final Draft, supra note 3, § 8(c) & cmts. a & b; Grundberg v.
37.
Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991); Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 478 (Cal.
1988).
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the benefit must outweigh the risk." Toner v. Lederle Lab., 732
P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho 1987).
Kan8a8-A prescription drug is not defective in design if "the
benefits it offered outweighed the risks its use posed in light of
knowledge at the time .... ." Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795
P.2d 915, 927 (Kan. 1990).
Oklahoma-For comment k to protect a manufacturer, the
"benefits of the product must outweigh its risks. 'This weighing
process should consider the value of the benefit, the seriousness
of the risk, and the likelihood of both.' Comment k ...requires
this risk-benefit analysis; the Comment speaks of a product's
utility justifying its risks." Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d
881, 886 (Okla. 1994) (citations omitted).
Rhode Iiland-"In order to qualify for a comment-k exemption, the apparent benefits of the drug must exceed the apparent risks, given the scientific knowledge available when the
drug was marketed." Castrignanov. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988).

